Shankh Mitra
Chief Executive Officer at Welltower
Thank you, Matt, and good morning everyone. I'll describe our capital allocation priorities in a rapidly evolving investment environment and review high level business trends before handing the call over to John who will detail operational trends. A little over a year ago, our senior housing operating business witnessed a powerful inflection point with occupancy gains and pricing power sustained through the remainder of the year despite Delta and Omicron variants.
This momentum continued into first quarter of this year and translated into the first period of year-over-year bottom-line growth for our company since the beginning of pandemic. Our total portfolio revenue is up 32.7% year-over-year, driven by both organic revenue growth, as well as a significant volume of high conviction capital deployment during the last 18 months. On a same-store basis, our senior housing operating portfolio revenue was up 11.2% year-over-year driven by 4.6% occupancy growth and 4.6% rate growth. Encouragingly, we saw a sequential pricing growth worth 4.3%, the fastest growth recorded in our history, despite only half of our operators pushing through in-house rent increases on January 1 schedule.
All of these translated into 18.4% same-store NOI growth in Q1 an impressive number that surpassed our expectations. We're all very encouraged by the speed at which street rates are moving up and we expect same-store NOI growth will accelerate into the second half of the year barring another COVID spike. All of these setting up to be a powerful earnings recovery that we anticipate in 2023 and beyond. Before I turn into investment environment I want to make two things here that are very important for multi-year earnings growth path.
Number one, in 2018 when we converted our Brandywine Senior Living lease to RIDEA, I mentioned that two other portfolio we had in triple-net structure that we hope to convert. One of them was Legend Senior Living. After many years of discussion with Tim Buchanan, Legend's legendary Founder and CEO, I'm pleased to report that we have converted this relation into RIDEA. Recall that we had an 88% and 20% JV between Welltower and Legend. At conversion, Tim contributed a portion of his profitable five brand new assets and has agreed to in future to help an agreement to create a powerful 93%, 7% equity partnership going forward.
Finally, after years of persuasion, we have convinced them that we can grow the pie using our data analytics platform so significantly that you will still be better off despite wanting a smaller portion of the pie. A partner of our company since 2019, Legend has paid every single dollar of brands that was owed to Welltower regardless of the coverage on a given day. Though this deal is dilutive to our FFO in 2022 due to significant agency labor issues [Phonetic] yesterday. We expect cash flow to relative to the previous rent was breakeven in the beginning 2023 and our shareholders will enjoy upside from thereon.
We hope for extraordinary partnership over last -- we had extraordinary partnership over the last three decades, and we hope that we will continue for many months to come. This transition along with the acquisition and future development partnership exemplifies our sole focus on enhancing long-term value of the portfolio and indicated the potential earnings upside in the portfolio that can be captured through a simple cap rate or multiple valuation methodology.
Number two, historically, our Show business focused on managing managers and assets. Now that we have significantly upgraded our operational capabilities, including through the hiring of John Burkart, our COO. Our focus in the Show business will mirror the real estate and management services that we provide in our Medical Office business or what an apartment REIT does. With the understanding that we are limited in providing care services in a helped qualified health care property. This fundamental shift in our approach has a profound impact on how we think about our role in the operating step.
This is particularly important as we think through the most important part of that operating platform, which is the technology stack. John will get into the details as part of his script, but we are delighted that he is in full-scale development and implementation of a true operating platform at Welltower. John is working closely with some of our best-operating partners to launch this, call it, RIDEA for now but honestly that doesn't do our new approach justice as to the scale and impact we think his plans will have on the customer experience and value creation overall.
Needless to say, we expect this multi-year initiative will have a tremendous impact on our earnings growth trajectory and long-term compounding machine that we are setting up at Welltower. Now let's talk about capital allocation. As you know, my team is extraordinarily focused on allocating capital to create far share value for existing shareholders. The keyword is existing. We favor our existing shareholders who have been our partners through thick and thin, especially through thin.
We are fiercely protective of their interest on a per share basis and owned act in a manner that does not create significant value for them. Because we're extremely transparent and genuinely dislike drama, I will mention to you that Welltower is the part F referenced in the HTA and HR merger property couple of weeks ago. Every week we call owners of assets and express our interest to buy them at a price, this was no different. I am genuinely disappointed that HR board and management did not engage with us. But that is their prerogative.
It is completely up to their shareholder and the Board which represents those shareholders to decide how to maximize value. Because of the many rumors circulating and the reports and articles about this, I'll mention few things before moving on to much more important items. Number one. We're a fair win-win people, we offer to buy the company on public information at $31.75 per share, plus a breakup fee of $163 million from a merger, which as you have seen the market borders at significantly value destructive per analyst reports. We believe that our cash offer provided better value to HR shareholders than the HTA merger and it was fully financed and we're prepared to move within days.
I've read research note that describes our unfair pricing relative to what might be a barcoded market cap rate. Please understand that we did not offer to buy an asset. We offer to buy a company that we are willing to pay for asset and pay breakup fee that built up company -- for company's existing shareholders from potential dilution than will respect analysis community has been writing about. I hope this will stop miss characterization of our offer and our intent. Number two. Welltower always has and always will honor its agreement with third parties including that with HTA. In fact, HTA itself highlighted our NDA with them by providing -- by first disclosing it to HR and then related to the public in the joint proxy.
Further our NDA with them does not contain a standstill that will apply us to making an offer for HR as a standalone entity. As you would expect we signed it with HTA in order to access information regarding HTA and its property, therefore the standstill only applies to HTA and its properties. Our proposal what expressly condition on HR not completing the HTA transaction. Number three. We have never chased a deal, and never will. We buy everything at a price and sell everything at a price. Although I'm disappointed that HR did not engage with us as our offer -- we thought our offer would result into a superior outcome for HR shareholders. I have no intention of being hocked-up.
I personally like Todd. I called him and expressed our interest. We didn't buy shares in the public market, nor did we act in anything but a friendly way. They did not engage under these circumstances we have nothing to do here. Number four. Contrary to what some analysts might have written this deal would not have been diluted to our senior housing growth. You don't know what proportion of equity, debt, or joint ventures we might have contemplated for the transaction. But even if you think we were to do this entirely on the balance sheet, it would be a rather simple exercise. Look at the NOI bridge in our business update, divide that NOI by existing number of shares, calculate the additional shares required by the HR transaction to calculate dilution on a per-share basis, and then add back the accretion from the deal.
You will see our existing shareholders would have covered ahead. We look at every single investment through the lens of opportunity thought. Specifically, we have to satisfactorily answer three questions that Burkart has started and then what, compared to what and the expense of what this is not different. And number five. We're not disappointed nor we are concerned about our growth for senior housing business while the contrary. In fact, we just reported 18.4% same-store NOI growth and expected to meaningfully accelerate in the second half of the year.
Now that I have put all these rumors to death, let's talk about the 30 or so owners who did engage with us to create win-win partnership transaction. Year-to-date we have closed $1.2 billion of acquisitions across 21 different off-market or privately negotiated transactions. This is a remarkable stat given the torrid pace of activity last year. I find it difficult to talk about specific deals as it feels like picking your favorite children but I still mention a handful of transactions to give you a sense.
We bought 700 units across three large communities in Washington State with Cogir to expand our partnership with Matthew and Dave. Dave Eskenazy is one of the best in the business and I'm glad that he is now back full time as Cogir US CEO. We're also expanding our partnership with the purchase of another property in Brentwood, located in the East Bay of Northern California. All properties were bought at a significant discount replacement cost, for example, the Brentwood asset contains large units and it was bought for 320K per unit.
We believe the replacement cost in East Bay today is easily significantly not $500,000 event. Additionally, we are significantly deepening our relationship with Dan and his team at StoryPoint with the acquisition of 33 communities in Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee in their backyard. With a median vintage of 2016, we're extremely pleased with the average price of 197K unit which is meaningful discount to replacement cost, with 63% of client average occupancy this sizable deal will be dilutive to our 2022 FFO per share but properties are anticipated to generate significant occupancy, margin, and cash flow growth in 2023 and beyond on the StoryPoint enhanced operating platform.
This is another example of us choosing the right long-term investment decision and cash flow growth of our GAAP earnings accretion. Another thing you hear from us consistently. In another transaction, we announced we are expanding our partnership with Courtney and her team at Oakmont with seven new assets in extraordinary locations in California. Courtney and her team are at the absolute top of the operating echelon and we cannot be happier to grow this partnership together.
Separately, within the medical office space we bought four building property portfolio on the campus of one of the strong hospitals in Birmingham, Alabama for a 5.5% cap rate in an absolute net lease structure at a great basis. Given the absolute debt structure, we expect unlevered IRR to be high-single-digit range. We also under contract to buy two large beautiful MOBs one in San Francisco Bay Area and other in Sacramento MSA for a high 5% growing in cap rate at a great basis. Again, we expect to generate high single-digit IRR in both cases.
In terms of the financing market in last 30 days or so, we have seen a massive shift with property-level leverage down 15 points, cost doubling and interest-only disappearing from the market both in seniors, as well as in MOBs. This is starting to have a tectonic impact on asset pricing. To put it bluntly, I have not been this excited about our acquisition prospects since Q4 of 2020. About six weeks ago an investor whom I respect very much asked me if I am optimistic about the next $7 billion of acquisition as I was about the last $7 billion on acquisitions that we did since pivoting to offense in 4Q of 2020.
I instinctively answered what I truly believe, that we're driven by value not by volume which this investor took it as a no. Today that answer will be unequivocally, yes. Yes, we are excited about the figuratively next $7 billion as we are when we acted in the last $7 billion. To that effect, our pipeline today is roughly $1.5 billion of deals and process across 20 different off-market or privately negotiated transactions. Several of these are potentially operating unit transactions, which we expect to be very popular with the sellers. Please recall that we define our pipeline as transaction that are already under contract. In addition to this, we're negotiating another couple of billion also acquisitions across several other transactions.
While we may not eventually succeed in convincing sellers to agree to our price, please note that we don't need any given transaction, price is the price. We see cracks in the market and are focused on where the path is going and not where the path might have been. The value of the party that never retreats and doesn't require debt has really been higher. In most class systems in nature, such as coastline, cloud, turbulence, no matter how much is scale up or scale down, you notice a remarkable sales similar property. You notice that same occurrence everywhere in nature. For example, a floret of a cauliflower is same as the cauliflower. This phenomenon is called fractal geometry. This is the same idea that our drive-time polygons and isochrones are based on, if you have seen our data science presentation. Increasingly -- interestingly organization history is full of companies who grow successfully through small bolt-on acquisition in that advantageous niche only to convince themselves on strategic acquisition that gets them in trouble. David Packard, the Founder of HP brilliantly said more businesses die of indigestion than starvation to describe this phenomenon.
At Welltower, we don't have strategic acquisitions. In fact sales similarity of mother nature is highly visible in our investment philosophy, no matter how small or big a specific investment is where after the same driven by the same factors in all cases we're buying, number one, a reasonable basis relative to replacement cost. And number two, where we can add value by driving operational improvement. We are not spread investing deal junkies. We are true total written investors and are optimistic that 2022 will be one of the best years in the company's history from an acquisition point. With that, I'll hand the call over to my partner, John Burkart, our Chief Operating Officer, John?
